

Emotions, feelings and intentionality

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Abstract. Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action or an event; such emotional feelings involve a special way of thinking of the object of the emotion, and I draw an analogy with Frank Jackson's well-known knowledge argument to show this. Finally, I try to show that, even if materialism is true, the phenomenology of emotional feelings, as described from a personal perspective, cannot be captured using only the theoretical concepts available for the impersonal stance of the sciences.

Introduction

Emotions involve feelings. Whilst I would not want to go so far as some and insist that they do so essentially, I would say that an emotion would, at least in typical cases, involve feelings at some point during its existence.¹ But what are the feelings that are – that can be – involved in an emotion? This is the central question that I want to address in this paper. I will argue that emotions involve two kinds of feeling, and that these two kinds are sometimes run together in our ordinary way of speaking of emotional experience, as for example when we say that I *felt* very afraid. First, there is what I will call *bodily feeling*, the feeling from the inside of the condition of one's body as being a certain way or as undergoing certain changes. For example, in fear I feel the hairs go up on the back of my neck. Secondly, there is what I will call *feeling towards*, the feeling one has towards the object of one's emotion. For example, in fear I feel the dangerousness of the lion. I will deal with these two kinds of feeling in the next two sections. Both, I will argue, are intentional.

Having discussed these two sorts of feelings, I will then try to show what it is that holds them together. The idea, roughly, is that they are held together by their phenomenology, by our everyday commonsense ontology of emotion, and by the narrative form of explanations of particular emotional experiences. And there will be deeper scientific explanations, which locate these everyday explanations within more general causal laws. However, I will suggest in my closing remarks, there are difficulties in seeing how a phenomenological account of emotional feelings, from what I will call the personal perspective, can be subsumed into a theoretical account of them, provided from the impersonal stance of the sciences.

Bodily feelings

A bodily feeling or sensation, the feeling from the inside of the condition of one's body, is intentional in the sense that the feeling is directed towards an object, one's body, as being a certain way or as undergoing certain changes. I will call this, as others have done, the perceptual account of bodily feelings.² When you feel an agonising pain in your elbow, the object of the sensation is your elbow which feels a certain way: agonisingly painful. Similarly, when you feel the prickly sensation of the hairs going up on the back of your neck, the object of the feeling is the hairs on the back of your neck which feel a certain way: prickly, as if they were rising. When intentionality is thus understood, in terms of directedness towards an object rather than in terms of "aboutness", bodily feelings are unproblematically intentional, being directed towards a part of one's body in a certain location.³

I would like to widen the perceptual account of emotional bodily feelings beyond awareness of the *internal* condition of one's body to include awareness through touch of the condition of the *surface* of one's body through its physical contact with objects.⁴ In picking up an object, a gun say, you feel your hands are slippery with sweat against the cool smooth surface of the barrel. Or you feel the dampness of the contact of your sweaty back with your wet shirt. Here the object of your awareness, through touch, is not only the condition of the surface of your body, but also the condition of the gun or your shirt and their manner of contact with your body. This seems to be an unproblematic extension of bodily feelings, given that the account is perceptual through and through: in the "pure" cases, the range of objects is restricted to sensation of the internal condition of one's body; in the case of feeling through the modality of touch (tactual sensation), the range of objects is extended to include the condition of the surface of one's body through its physical contact with objects.

The condition of one's body, and involuntary changes to it, can be part of an emotional episode: muscular reactions, hormonal changes, changes to the autonomic nervous system, and so on – their precise characterisation is not my concern here. But what is my concern is the *feeling* of the condition of, and changes to, one's body, which can also be part of an emotional episode. Clearly, the two do not necessarily go together. As part of an episode of fear, the hairs might go up on the back of your neck, but you might not feel this happening. Moreover, on this perceptual account of bodily feelings, one can be wrong about one's feelings – hallucinations, illusions and other sorts of mistake are possible: it can feel to you as if the hairs are going up on the back of your neck when they are not, or even when there are no hairs, just as in the phantom limb case it can feel to you as if there is a pain in your left leg when the leg has in fact been amputated. One can also be mistaken about whether the feeling is part of an emotional experience. You might, for example, feel your face going red and think that this is because you are embarrassed (that you blushed *in* embarrassment), whilst in fact your face is red because you have just come in to a warm room on a frosty day.⁵ The converse is also possible: you can think that the feeling is *not* part of an emotion when it really is.

However, certain bodily feelings can and do provide a *prima facie* reason for one's believing that one is experiencing an emotion of a certain type. How is this so? The answer is in principle fairly straightforward and uncontroversial, although the details would take some working out. Many emotions, especially short-term emotions such as fear, anger, and disgust, involve characteristic bodily changes – they have what Paul Ekman has called a “distinctive physiology” (1994, p. 18).⁶ Along the same lines, Paul Griffiths associates these bodily changes with the so-called *affect programs*, which include “musculoskeletal responses such as flinching and orienting, . . . endocrine system changes and consequent changes in the level of hormones, and . . . autonomic system changes” (1997, p. 77). Now, unlike Griffiths and, perhaps, Ekman, I do not wish to draw sharp lines between affect program responses and other sorts of response that we intuitively call emotional, but there is no doubt that some shorter-term emotional experiences do involve characteristic involuntary changes to the bodily condition, and there may well be good evolutionary reasons why this is so (see Griffiths 1997). Given this, and given our capacity to perceive these changes from the inside, then we have an epistemic route to the belief that one is experiencing an emotion of a certain type.⁷

Whilst the feeling of your bodily condition may truly reveal that you are experiencing some emotion or other, it may not be clear just which sort of emotion it is; it might be irritation, or it might be excitement. As we move

further away from the relatively short-term emotional response which is the central concern of Ekman and Griffiths, we tend at the same time to move further away from there being bodily changes associated with an emotion that one can feel and that can provide a reason for believing that one is experiencing an emotion of *that* sort. This is not to say that there are no such bodily changes, or that one cannot feel them; rather, it is to say just that the feeling of them is not of such a nature that it can provide a *prima facie* reason, in and of itself, for believing that one is experiencing the emotion. There are, I think, different sorts of bodily feeling involved with irritation and excitement, but they are not of a character that one can make an inference from the bodily feeling alone to the belief that one is experiencing the emotion; rather, the bodily feeling becomes recognisably one of irritation, or of excitement, once one is already aware that it is that emotion that one is feeling.

Bodily feelings, including the bodily feelings involved in emotional experience, can tell you things not just about the condition of your body and the sort of emotion you are experiencing, but also about other parts of the world beyond the surface of your body (and what comes into physical contact with it).⁸ For example, a feeling of cold can give you *prima facie* reason to believe that the central heating has turned itself off. Similarly, a feeling of the hairs going up on the back of one's neck can give you *prima facie* reason to believe that *there is something dangerous about*. This latter belief is purely quantificational, identifying the properties of the "object" of the emotion only as being what the scholastics called "proper" to the emotion; for example, being fearful or dangerous are the properties that are "proper" to fear. One can perhaps put the idea more clearly in terms of determinable and determinate properties: fearfulness is a determinable property, and the purely quantificational belief is that there is something in the environment that has certain (but unknown) determinate properties that fall under this determinable property.

There is then – spelling it out – a possible three-stage epistemic route:

1. from a bodily feeling (that is, perception of one's bodily condition) to the related perceptual belief about one's bodily condition;⁹
2. from a perceptual belief about one's bodily condition to the belief that one is experiencing an emotion of a certain type;¹⁰
3. from a belief that one is experiencing an emotion of a certain type to the quantificational belief that there is something in the environment that has the determinable property that is "proper" to emotions of that type.¹¹

Thus, feeling the hairs going up on the back of your neck is a *prima facie* reason to believe that there is something dangerous about. It is *prima facie* partly

because bodily feelings can mislead one: one can believe that one has learned something about the world outside the bounds of one's body, whereas in truth the feelings reveal something about oneself. For example, a feeling of cold can seem to give you reason to believe that the temperature in the room has dropped, and thus that the central heating has switched itself off; but in fact you are experiencing the first signs of 'flu. Similarly, if you are of a nervous disposition, you might come to believe there to be something dangerous nearby through feeling the hairs go up on the back of your neck; but in fact the danger is not a real one.

This epistemic route from bodily feeling to "object" of emotion seems to me to be important, and to capture a sense in which we are right to say that we should pay attention to, or "listen to", our feelings. For example, when one's feelings give one *prima facie* reason to believe that there is something dangerous in the environment, one often, so to speak, "casts around" the world beyond the bounds of one's body to try to *identify* the object of the emotion, and what it is about the object – its determinate properties – in virtue of which it is dangerous. You might wake up in the middle of the night feeling frightened – that is, you are aware of your bodily condition as being characteristic of fear – and wonder what woke you up and whether it really is dangerous (or was it all just a dream?). Or, when you are talking to someone, your feeling of your sweaty palms suggests that the person is frightening in some determinate respect, but you have not yet worked out in what respect. In the first case, you are trying to identify both object and determinate property, and in the second case, you are only unclear about the determinate property. But, in all such cases, one should remember that bodily feelings are only *prima facie* reason to believe that one is experiencing an emotion of a certain type and that that emotion reveals something about the world and not just about your own condition.

One might object that this talk of epistemic routes and of *prima facie* reasons sounds too intellectual and "cool" to be faithful to the phenomenology of emotional experience. But the objection would only be a good one if I were trying to give an account of the actual fully conscious stages of reasoning that one has to go through in order for one to be justified in coming to believe, for example, that there is something dangerous in the vicinity. But the account is, rather, a *philosophical* account of the justificatory role of bodily feelings in emotional epistemology. So far as stage (1) is concerned, the account is just a particular application of how perceptual experiences can ground perceptual belief, and no one, whatever philosophical account they give of this, seriously suggests that, in normal cases, one *consciously* reasons from perceptual experience to perceptual belief. So far as stages (2) and (3) are concerned, an

analogy may help to show that the objection misfires here too. Consider the process of driving a car. When one is first learning to drive a car (reversing around a corner, say), one's steps in reasoning may be only too painfully conscious ("If I turn the wheel this way, then the front wheels ought to do this, and then the back of the car ought to do that"). But after a while it all comes perfectly "naturally", and one can easily perform complicated manoeuvres whilst one's mind is elsewhere, and without any reasoning process of which one is consciously aware. So, if this is possible in this case, then there is no reason why it should not also be possible in the case of the emotions.

The epistemic route to one's bodily condition that I have been discussing – by feeling "from the inside" – is only available first-personally: one cannot perceive in *this* way the condition of someone else's body, the boundary of which extends beyond the location where one's own body ends.¹² However, this is not in any way to suggest that bodily feelings are essentially private, or that we cannot often perceive others' bodily feelings in different sorts of ways. When we think of feelings, and recognise them as what they are, we are deploying a common set of concepts, shared with others, and we can as well think and talk of how another is feeling as we can think and talk of how we are feeling. We are speaking third-personally, but still personally. Because being able to think about and talk about one's feelings requires a shared set of concepts, the child must come to learn the use of the concept from its carers, and learn to apply the concept to herself; after all, there is nothing *intrinsic* to the experience of, for example, the hairs going up on the back of your neck to suggest that it is characteristic of a feeling of fear. And, at the same time, and without the priority of the first-personal over the second and third-personal, or vice versa, she must learn to apply the concept to others, on the basis of their bodily condition, or their behaviour, including what others say about their own feelings.¹³ So, to know what someone is feeling, one does not need – which is impossible – somehow to share his unique, immediate and "privileged" method of access; all one needs to be able to do is answer the question, "What is he feeling?" (Cf. Austin 1946, pp. 96–97). It is true that there is a unique, immediate and privileged route to knowledge of one's own feelings, namely introspection "from the inside", but this should not be taken to imply either that introspection is an indefeasible route to self-knowledge (for it is not), or that knowledge of others' feelings is impossible (for it is not).

However, there is a sense – a different one – in which you cannot be said to know what someone is feeling if you have, for some reason, not learned to apply the concept to yourself; say you have never felt fear in your life, you might be able to say that someone else is feeling fear on the basis of their bodily condition or their behaviour, but the concept that you are deploying will not

be the same concept as you would deploy if you knew what it was like to feel fear. I will return to this point later.

Having now considered the first kind of emotional feeling, bodily feelings, I now want to turn to the second kind, namely feeling towards. Bodily feelings alone cannot reveal to you what your emotion is about; as we have seen, the most they can reveal is that you are feeling an emotion about *something or other*, which has a certain determinable property. Feelings towards, on the other hand, are directed towards the object of one's emotion *as such* – for example, feeling fear towards *the lion*.

Feeling towards

When an emotion is directed towards its object, then this is a sort of *feeling towards* the object. The object can be a thing or a person, a state of affairs, or an action or event: when you fear the lion, the object of your fear is a thing, which has certain determinate properties (sharp teeth, perhaps), that will explain why you fear it; when you are angry about the level of unemployment, the object is a state of affairs (or a fact); and when you are upset at the way she intentionally turned her back on you when you came into the room, the object of your emotion is an action. The notion of an *object* in this sense (object of emotion, of feeling, or of thought) is sometimes glossed in terms of *content*, and I will make use of this terminology; although, as will already be clear, I do not want this notion of content to be taken to imply that content must be capturable in terms of a proposition. When I speak of “content” I will mean content as individuated in a sufficiently fine-grained way to capture a subject's way of thinking, not content as individuated purely in terms of reference. (Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta; he did not want to marry his mother: “that he marry Jocasta” and “that he marry his mother” are different contents, even though in every possible world where Jocasta exists, he would marry his mother by satisfying his desire to marry Jocasta, for “Jocasta” and “Oedipus' mother” refer to the very same person. It is thus perfectly intelligible that Oedipus should feel horror when he realised that Jocasta was his mother, and thus that he had – unintentionally – married his mother).

Feeling towards is unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one's bodily condition or of oneself *as* experiencing an emotion.¹⁴ Feeling towards is thus something that a creature which is incapable of self-reflective thought – a dog or a toddler, for example – could achieve. We adult humans, however, are capable of a turn of reflectiveness: we are capable of *noticing* that we have feel-

ings towards something. For example, you are in an audience at a conference and a new speaker takes the stand. A friend next to you observes that you are becoming increasingly restless; your fingers are drumming on your notepad, your foot is tapping, and your lips and jaw are tense. Your friend surmises, rightly, that you are becoming irritated by something about the speaker: his manner, what he is saying, or something. Yet you are not yet aware of this: you have not noticed that you are feeling irritated by the speaker; yet you do have feelings of irritation towards him. Then your friend passes you a note, asking what is irritating you; and *then* you notice that, or become aware that, you are feeling this emotion. Before seeing the note, you had feelings of irritation towards the speaker, but were not aware that this was so.¹⁵

The notion of having feeling towards things in the world may seem to be a puzzling one: it is not a familiar sort of attitude in the philosopher's armoury, unlike, for example, belief, desire, perception or imagination. There is, accordingly, a philosophical approach that seeks to give an account of the emotions by a sort of divide and rule: first, to capture their intentionality in terms of these familiar unemotional attitudes and contents – that is to say, attitudes towards contents that we can have when we are not experiencing an emotion; and secondly, as an afterthought so to speak, to capture the phenomenology of emotional experience by reference to feelings as non-intentional states or as intentional states that are feelings directed towards the condition of one's body; but in neither case are these feelings directed towards objects in the world beyond the body. This is what I have called the "add-on theory" of emotions (Goldie 2000). What I want to expand on here is how emotions are not like the add-on theory suggests; rather, emotional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion's intentionality, of its directedness towards the world outside one's body, will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology. Intentionality and phenomenology are inextricably linked. Moreover, I will try to show, the phenomenology is neither specifically an aspect of the attitude nor of the content: phenomenology infuses both attitude and content.¹⁶

Let me begin with an example which I have appealed to elsewhere, from Michael Stocker's seminal paper, "Psychic Feelings". He says:

[H]aving fallen on the ice, the very same knowledge of (and wishes to avoid) the dangers of walking on the ice are "emotionally present" to me. They concern me to the point of my being afraid. Before the fall, I had only an intellectual appreciation of the very same dangers (and a rather pro-forma desire to avoid them). Then I only saw the dangers, now I also feel them (1983, pp. 20–21).

What has happened here – what is the difference between before and after? As I will show, it would be mistaken to insist that the only difference is in the attitude: let us say between “only seeing” the dangers before and, afterwards, using my terminology, “feeling towards” the very same dangers. But this is not the right way to characterise feeling towards as both intentional and having a phenomenology. The difference between before and after also lies in the content: they may be the very same dangers, in the referential sense, for no new dangers have come into view, but the *way of thinking* of these very same dangers is different. When we think of something as being dangerous, we might just think of it as meriting fear, and we can do that without actually feeling fear towards it. Then, when we come to think of it *with fear*, the dangerousness of the object, and the determinate features towards which the thought is directed, is grasped in a different way. That is to say, the content of the thought is different; one’s way of thinking of it is completely new. It is not just the old way of thinking of it, plus some new element. Rather, it is more like coming to see a hidden shape in a drawing, or coming to see the shape of the face on the visible surface of the moon: one’s way of seeing is completely new.

Is there a requirement to give a substantial characterisation of what is the difference in terms of phenomenology between feeling towards – having some feelingful attitude towards something – and having a feelingless attitude towards that thing? I have in the past said that there is not, and have been criticised for so doing.¹⁷ But the options here are limited. One cannot characterise the difference impersonally, perhaps in terms of functional role of the thought in the subject’s overall mental economy, for what one is trying to characterise is the phenomenology: to capture what the experience is like for the subject, and how the world strikes the subject in emotional experience. And one cannot guarantee to be able to characterise the difference in language, because the difference may be of a more fine-grained nature than language can capture. Nevertheless, let me try to say a little more about this, and to say things I have said before in another way.

Consider colour perception. Frank Jackson, in his famous “knowledge argument” against materialism, offered us a thought experiment about Mary, the scientist who knows all there is to know about colour vision, but who has lived all her life in a black and white world.¹⁸ One day, Mary is taken outside the laboratory and sees for the first time something red – a red rose. At this point, Jackson tells us, Mary learns something new: she learns a new fact about conscious experience, namely what it is like to have an experience of seeing something red.¹⁹ She exclaims “So that is what it is like for something to look red!” Now, Jackson has taken his argument to establish that Mary has become acquainted with a new non-material property of conscious experience.²⁰ This

point can be – and is – disputed by materialists: there is, they say, no such non-material *property*. But materialists can (and should) still accept that Mary gains a new *way of thinking* of a property that she was already able to think of in another way. Before, she had only a *theoretical* concept of the experience as, roughly, being something of the kind that plays a certain sort of causal role. Afterwards, Mary is like the rest of us who have normal colour vision: she knows *what it is like* to see something red – she has a grasp of the *phenomenology* of the experience. And with this new phenomenological way of thinking of colour experience she gains all sorts of new powers and potentialities of thought and imagination; for example, she can imagine and remember what it is like to see red things. So afterwards, she has a *phenomenal* concept of the experience.²¹ (I express her new way of thinking in terms of a new *concept* to make the point vivid; but I do not want to be taken to suggest that Mary now has two utterly *distinct* concepts, one theoretical and the other phenomenal. Rather, her newly-acquired phenomenal way of thinking of the experience of seeing something red will *subsume and transform* her earlier non-phenomenal way of thinking of the experience).

Moreover, when we turn from the properties of Mary's experience, and towards the properties of the world as she experiences them, we can see that Mary gains new powers and potentialities of thought and imagination here too. Before, Mary had complete theoretical knowledge of colour and of colour vision, so she would have been able to make judgements about the colour of things in the world using *theoretical* concepts of colour properties; in particular, she would have been able to judge "That rose is red" (she would have had the requisite laboratory equipment to "read off" the colour properties). So she could do this without ever having seen anything as red – without knowing what it is for something in the world to *look* red. Afterwards, with her new powers and potentialities of thought and imagination, she can, for example, classify things by the way they *look*, and remember and imagine the *look* of a red rose. In particular, when Mary now judges "That rose is red", the content of her judgement is different, for now she understands what it is for something to be red in a new way. Now, she has a *perceptual* concept of red, whereas before she had only the theoretical concept. (Again, to make the point vivid I express her new way of thinking in terms of a new concept; but, again, I do not want to be taken to suggest that Mary now has two utterly distinct concepts, one theoretical and the other phenomenal.)²²

I now want to put forward an analogous thought experiment in relation to the dangerous ice. Irene is an icy-cool ice-scientist. Being an ice-scientist, she knows all the properties of ice. In particular, she has complete knowledge of the dangers that can arise from walking on ice; show her any icy pond or lake

and she will know where the dangers lie. Yet she is icy-cool, and has never felt fear (far-fetched perhaps, but no more than Mary and her black and white world; imagine that Irene has been brought up in an incredibly coddled manner). Nevertheless, in spite of this lack, she not only has a theoretical concept of dangerousness; she also has a theoretical concept of fear, as being a sort of state that, roughly, plays a causal role: people are typically afraid when they perceive dangerous things, and they respond to fear by behaving in certain typical ways. Then, one day, Irene goes out onto the ice, falls, and for the first time feels fear – fear towards the dangerous ice. She now knows, “from the inside”, what it is like to *feel* fear, so she has gained a new concept – a phenomenal concept. And she has also gained a new perceptual concept, of dangerousness, of which she previously only had theoretical knowledge. When Irene now thinks of the ice as dangerous, she can do so in a new way – in a fearful way: she can now think of it *with fear*. Before, she knew that the ice was dangerous, for she knew that it merited fear, but, because she now is able to think in a new way of fear, she now understands in a new way what it is for the ice to be dangerous. Before, when she said “That ice is dangerous”, the thought expressed was a judgement made without feeling; afterwards what she expressed was *feeling towards* the ice.²³

But the before-after difference for Irene is not just a difference in her way of thinking of fear and her way of thinking of dangerousness; the difference is also to be located in the effects of these new ways of thinking on the rest of her mental economy, for, like Mary, she gains new powers and potentialities of thought, imagination and feeling; thus, there are functional differences that parallel the acquisition of her new concepts. Recall Stocker’s words: “Before the fall, I had only an intellectual appreciation of the very same dangers (and a rather pro-forma desire to avoid them). Then I only saw the dangers, now I also feel them”. Similarly, one of the effects on Irene is that what was before “a rather pro-forma desire to avoid the dangers” is now an emotional desire to avoid them: that is, she has now what Stocker calls a “feeling-laden” desire. This is not simply the old desire, plus an added degree of strength to account for the feeling element, for, as I have shown, the content of her desire is also different.

Furthermore, Irene’s new powers and potentialities, arising from her newly acquired concepts, *reverberate* through the rest of her mental economy, affecting not only her desire to avoid the ice, her expressive behaviour, and the ways in which she acts (as contrasted with her actions, grossly described, which might remain unchanged), but also her imagination and memories. For example, deploying her new phenomenal concept, she can now remember experiences of danger in a fearful way that she was unable to in the past. And when

she imagines someone else feeling fear, she can imagine “from the inside” what it would be like to be in his or her shoes. Before, when she thought of someone being afraid, her thought was restricted, roughly, to the causal role that that person’s experience played – its typical causes and effect; and this way of thinking is one that might be available to, say, a Martian who was incapable of feelings of fear. Now, when she judges that someone else is afraid, she can deploy in the thought her newly gained phenomenal concept of fear.

A further change in Irene’s mental economy is that feelings towards, which she is now capable of experiencing, typically manifest a degree of insensitivity to evidence, and, more generally, to cool and calm reason; they are “cognitively impenetrable”, at least to a degree. For example, a longing for your lover to return can make your emotionally held belief that she will come back one day highly insensitive to evidence to the contrary; and the feeling of longing itself can be equally insensitive to the thought that the object of your longing really is not at all desirable. Moreover, not only is one insensitive to the evidence; one can also come to have doubts about the *source* of that evidence. For example, you tell me that she will not come back to me, but, because I will not – *cannot* – give up my emotionally held belief that she will come back one day, I conclude that you must be misleading me; perhaps you have some vested interest in the matter, which leads you to tell me these lies.²⁴

This tendency for feeling towards to be insensitive to cool and calm reason is part of the *passivity* of emotional experience: we often feel *in the grip of* an emotion that reason cannot shift. A further aspect of this passivity is in the reverberations of which I have been speaking. In the example of coming to feel fear of the ice, the potential reverberation is *from* the way the world is presented to the subject *to* desire, imagination and memory. In other cases, the course of the reverberation might be different. For example, it might begin with something that you desire, imagine, or remember, or with something that you make-believe when reading fiction: then, when feelings become involved, all sorts of connections within the mind can lead you on to all sorts of other emotional thoughts, feelings, imaginings and rememberings, perhaps on the face of it unconnected to the point where you started. We know this from daydreaming: we ask ourselves “How did I get from *there* to *here*?”; and it might take some working out.

So far, then, I have considered the two sorts of feeling that can be involved in emotional experience. I now want to turn to the question of what holds them together in our minds as being part of *this* fear, *that* disgust or whatever it might be.

What is it that holds together bodily feelings and feeling towards?

To begin with, the phenomenology of emotion is such that we *experience* bodily feelings and feelings towards almost as one. I have tried elsewhere to capture the intimacy of this connection by speaking of a sort of *borrowed intentionality* in bodily feelings (Goldie 2000). What is borrowed is not the intentionality itself, as the bodily feelings are already intentional, but rather what is borrowed is the directedness of bodily feelings towards *the world beyond the body*. And this is through an association of ideas very much along Humean lines.

Our everyday, commonsense ontology of emotion supports this phenomenology: we think of emotional experience as a unity. Accordingly, in giving an account of this ontology, there is a philosophical temptation which should be resisted: the Procrustean one of analysing the emotions into “ingredients” which fall neatly into the categories of the mental and the material or the physical: those that are mental – beliefs, desires, feelings, and so on; and those that are material – physiological states, such as the condition of the musculature. The source of the temptation begins in the notion that there is a *preconceived* distinction between the mental and the material of which we have a clear and distinct grasp from a commonsense point of view; and it is just here that the emotions represent a challenge. It is not so much that the emotions span the divide between mind and body, or even that, in the emotions, mind and body are “very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled” to borrow a phrase of Descartes:²⁵ more fundamentally, our ordinary, everyday way of thinking of the emotions, and the phenomenology of emotional experience, strongly suggest that it is the clarity of the preconceived distinction itself that should be thrown into doubt: the unity of emotional experience is prior to any such distinction.

What we need is an ontology of the emotions, capturable from the perspective of everyday thinking, and faithful to the phenomenology, in which an emotion is what I will call a *substantial event*,²⁶ which has certain manifest features: thoughts, feelings, bodily changes, and expressions. No doubt some of these features will be paradigmatically mental and others paradigmatically material, but there will be much that cannot be said to be obviously the one or the other; but they are united in the substantial event, which itself has a certain kind of unity, and this unity in turn can be partly explained by the nature of the event. Then, with this notion in play of an emotion as a substantial event, we can go further with the idea of borrowed intentionality: we can say that the emotion itself, qua substantial event, is directed towards the world beyond the body; not just those paradigmatically mental features, the thoughts and

feelings that are involved, but also the bodily condition, bodily changes and expressions of emotion, as well as the actions that flow from the emotion. With an ontology that puts the *philosophical* distinction between mind and body as secondary in consideration of our emotional lives, we can do justice to the unity of emotional life – lived heart and mind, body and soul. We should not, as Heidegger rightly insisted in another context, “split the phenomenon”.²⁷

Our accounts of particular emotional experience, our own and those of others, are equally faithful to this way of thinking. These accounts are narrative in form, and temporal in structure, with a beginning, middle, and end, making no principled distinction between those elements that are mental and those that are physical. Such accounts are, in the sense used by Collingwood, *idiographic*; as the OED defines this term, they are “concerned with the individual, pertaining to or descriptive of single and unique facts and processes”.²⁸ However, one should not get the impression that idiographic explanations are condemned to float entirely free of the causal nexus, and of the possibility of general or scientific laws, just in virtue of being concerned with particular substantial events, and of being narrative in form. Idiographic explanations can be replete with sentences that are, or that imply, causal explanations, and these causal explanations will imply that, despite their particularity, there are nevertheless general causal laws under which these particular events fall. Indeed, so far as concerns the emotions, much work in evolutionary psychology, in developmental psychology, in social anthropology, and in cognitive science generally has pointed towards deeper explanations of why and how our emotional lives have come to take this particular shape and course, and why emotions have the unity that I am pointing towards. The everyday commonsense ontology of the emotions, and narrative explanations of particular emotions, are not in competition with these deeper sorts of theoretical, scientific explanation (deeper in terms of causal explanation and the laws to which they appeal).

But they are in different businesses. Let us return to black-and-white Mary and ice-queen Irene. When they first had their new experiences, they gained new powers and potentialities of thought, imagination and feeling, based on their newly acquired phenomenal concepts of their experiences, and on their new ways of thinking of properties in the world – their perceptual concepts. According to the materialist, phenomenal concepts (of the experience of red and of the experience of fear) are concepts of material properties. But when we use them, we are thinking of these properties, as David Papineau puts it, “not as items in the material world, but in terms of *what they are like*” (2002, p. 48). On the other hand, purely theoretical concepts of such properties would be ones which, roughly, pick out the experiences by their causal role, and which

leave out entirely what it is like, in the sense that I have been trying to capture;²⁹ these were the concepts that black-and-white Mary and ice-queen Irene had before their new experiences. Now, in the materialist view that I have been canvassing, our thoughts, feelings and emotions can be fully described using these purely theoretical concepts. From this perspective, which I will call the *impersonal perspective*, there is nothing left out; a Martian, incapable of colour vision and of emotion, would be satisfied with it as a *complete* account of the workings of human beings. Yet, when we compare this perspective with the *personal perspective*, which includes first, second and third personal, singular and plural,³⁰ there is much that is left out: our Martian, in possession of a complete scientific account of the workings of a human being, would still have *no conception* of *what it is like* to have the experiences that the impersonal perspective picks out using its theoretical concepts. So we seem to be in this position. Scientific investigation of the emotions, from a purely impersonal perspective, deploying purely impersonal theoretical concepts, inevitably – and quite appropriately from this stance – makes no *use* of phenomenal concepts, which are only available from the personal perspective; whereas phenomenology is essentially personal, and makes essential use of phenomenal concepts.³¹

So, in one sense, the impersonal stance of the sciences leaves nothing out; in another sense, it leaves much out, for it leaves out our ordinary, everyday way of thinking of our emotional experiences and what these experiences are experiences of. But perhaps that does not matter given that science and phenomenology are in different businesses. It would matter, however, if science were to aspire to give an adequate characterisation of the phenomenology from its impersonal perspective, for this cannot be done: science is impersonal, and our ordinary way of thinking about emotional experience is personal. It would also matter if one were to think that this is just the “problem of consciousness”, where this is circumscribed as “phenomenal consciousness” – the so-called “hard problem” – and that this can be bracketed off for later consideration – a version of the add-on theory. But this cannot be done either, for, in emotion, phenomenology is inextricably linked to “access consciousness” and intentionality, and thus with what is described as the “easy” problem, so-called because it supposedly can be accounted for using purely theoretical concepts – roughly, in informational processing or functionalist terms.³² For example, the way of thinking, from the inside, of the hairs going up on the back of one’s neck is essentially phenomenological, but it is also essentially intentional, being directed towards a part of one’s body as being in a certain condition. Moreover, when we turn to Mary’s and Irene’s new ways of thinking of the world beyond the bounds of their bodies, to their new perceptual

concepts of red and of dangerousness, these too are essentially phenomenological and essentially intentional. This inextricable linkage between phenomenology and intentionality in emotion will, I suspect, make the so-called “easy problem” hard, and not the so-called “hard problem” easy.³³

Notes

1. I have argued for this at length in Goldie (2000). A long-lasting emotion, when feelings are not actually involved, will involve dispositions to have certain sorts of feelings.
2. See Armstrong (1968), Crane (1998), and Martin (1995) from which I have learned much. Crane has argued (also in Crane 1998) that intentionality is the mark of the mental; nothing that I say is inconsistent with this.
3. In addition, one can be aware of the position of one’s body and its movement through proprioception, as one might be aware of the tapping of one’s foot under the table. See Eilan, Marcel and Bermúdez (1995, p. 13) for a helpful, non-exhaustive list of what they call “internal information systems”.
4. Crane says that bodily sensation is “the awareness of things going on in one’s body” (1998, p. 237), and Martin says that “when one feels a sensation, one thereby feels as if something is occurring within one’s body” (1995, p. 267). I am not sure how literally either of them wishes the “in” or the “within” to be taken.
5. The experiments by Schachter and Singer (1962) show this. Wollheim (1999, pp. 115–128) has an excellent discussion of the role of feelings in emotion and of these experiments.
6. See Ekman (1992, 1994) for his list of “basic emotions”.
7. This is not to say, of course, that one need perceive, for example, an endocrine system change *as such*. Perhaps all one needs to perceive is that funny feeling in your stomach that you recognise as a characteristic part of the relevant emotion. Austin (1946) made a nice distinction between what is a sign of an emotion and what is part of the emotion itself: the feeling of one’s bodily condition can be a sign of an oncoming emotion (not yet upon you), or it can be part of an emotion that you are already experiencing. For example, the feeling of tension in the muscles between the shoulders may be a sign of impending irritation, or of an irritation that is already on you.
8. I was helped in this paragraph by Smith (2002).
9. Brewer (1999) gives a persuasive *first-order* account of how perceptual experience can provide reasons for empirical beliefs: this account does not require any *second-order* reflection on the process by which such beliefs are acquired.
10. This is something that the child comes to *learn*; it is not a priori that a certain bodily condition is related to a certain type of emotion. I say more about this below.
11. Where we are concerned with the *object* of emotion, the notion of environment has to be taken in a wide sense: for example, the sight of red numbers on a computer screen in London might bring about your fear, but the object of your fear is falling bond prices in the Japanese markets (in which you are too heavily invested for your own good). Cf Heidegger on the notion of *de-severance* (1962, p. 105ff).
12. For an argument for this, see Martin (1995), and for an alternative view, see Brewer (1995).

13. See the papers by Brewer, Hutto and Smith in Goldie (ed), (2002).
14. One can, however, have feelings towards one's own body, where these are not bodily feelings as I have characterised them. Here the object of the emotion is the body image (Gallagher 1995). For example, I can feel disgust at my fatness or at my arthritic fingers.
15. The difference between unreflective engagement with the world and reflective awareness of one's engagement should not be taken to be a stark one: one can be more or less aware of how the world strikes one. Cf Stocker (1983, p. 14). This account should be able readily to accommodate repressed feelings, not available to be recognized through introspection alone.
16. Indeed, the argument might suggest that the distinction between attitude and content is one to be suspicious of; but I will stick with it, as it is useful for expository purposes.
17. See Goldie (2000, p. 61) and Roberts (2001). Roberts seeks to make out the difference in terms of emotions as concern-based construals, where the difference between this and construal without concern is "that the relevant concern is *taken up into the construal* (not just added on to it)", so that "emotions do have a different 'content' from analogous non-emotional construals". This is an interesting idea, and we are, I think, not that far apart; but given that concern can be taken up into a construal where there is no emotion, as a pilot might have a Gibsonian-style concern-based construal of a runway on landing, I am not sure that Roberts' approach is not open to the same criticism that he makes of mine.
18. Jackson (1982, 1986).
19. There is a dangerous ambiguity here in the notion of *qualia*, so I will avoid the term. As Martin points out (1998), the term is sometimes taken to suggest that the subject matter is the subjective, qualitative properties of the experience – the *phenomenal properties of the experience*. Or it could be taken to suggest that the subject matter is the intentional properties of the experience – the *presented aspects of the experience*.
20. Jackson would, however, seem recently to have changed his mind about this.
21. For this way of putting things, see Papineau (2002), although Papineau talks of material concepts where I talk of theoretical concepts. Some materialists (Dennett 1991; Lewis 1990) deny that Mary learns any new facts. These materialists are called "deflationists" by Block (2002). "Inflationists", such as Papineau (2002), allow that Mary has gained new knowledge, which she can express by using the phenomenal concept that she was not able to use before. Similarly, Oedipus gains new knowledge when he learns that Jocasta is his mother.
22. What I say here is not intended to imply that it is a necessary condition for having a perceptual concept of red that one has a prior phenomenal *concept* of the experience of redness. Rather, having the perceptual concept of red only requires that one has had, through colour vision, experiences of red things; and one can satisfy this requirement without having the introspective powers that are involved in having a phenomenal concept of that type of experience.
23. The same points as I made in the preceding footnote about the relation between phenomenal concepts and perceptual concepts apply *mutatis mutandis* to the concepts of fear and dangerousness. See McDowell (1985), who also makes a connection between secondary qualities, such as colour, and the dangerous. There is a further question of whether someone who does not know what it is like to be afraid will be able reliably to pick out all and only things that are dangerous, given the "shapelessness" of the prop-

- erty (cf Taylor 1985). I will just assume here for the sake of argument that Irene is as good at identifying dangerous things as Mary is at identifying red things. This is, after all, a thought experiment.
24. Leontes, in Shakespeare's *The Winter's Tale*, went so far in his jealousy as to reject the evidence of the oracle of Apollo, that his wife was chaste, and he a "jealous tyrant" (Act III, Scene II).
 25. *Meditations* VI, CSM II, p. 56. The "as it were" is very telling.
 26. I am indebted to Tim Crane here (forthcoming). The idea is to develop Crane's recent discussion of substances, and to draw a parallel between what makes an object a *substance*, and what makes an event a *substantial* event. An object is a bearer of properties that persists through time, being wholly present at each moment of its existence; a *substance* is an object which has a certain kind of unity, partly explained by its nature. As a parallel, an event has temporal parts, not wholly present at each moment of its duration; a *substantial* event is an event which has a certain kind of unity, partly explained by its nature.
 27. 1962, p. 132. Glendinning (1998) helped me to see the importance of this remark in Heidegger.
 28. I am grateful to Neil Manson for telling me of Collingwood's remarks about idiographic explanations.
 29. Cf Chalmers' (1996) distinction between phenomenal and psychological concepts. Papineau suggests that our ordinary, everyday way of thinking of these properties involves both sorts of concept: "an everyday term like 'pain' expresses *both* a phenomenal concept of pain, a concept of a state that feels a certain way, so to speak, *and* a psychological (i.e. theoretical) concept of pain, a concept that refers by association with a certain causal role" (2002, p. 98).
 30. It is a potential source of confusion to speak of the impersonal stance of the sciences as "third-personal", as does for example Chalmers (1996).
 31. Science, however, will presumably need to *mention* phenomenal concepts in order to explain the new powers and potentialities that arise from having these concepts. Some materialists (Papineau 2002), and their opponents of course (Block 2002), are negative about the prospects for scientific psychology of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts. Block sees this as a deep epistemic problem for materialism.
 32. Phenomenal consciousness, Block says, is "just *experience*; access consciousness is a kind of control" (1998, p. 26). See Chalmers (1996) for the idea that these two sorts of consciousness are respectively hard and easy problems. See Eilan (1998) for a very illuminating discussion.
 33. I am very grateful to Tim Crane, David Papineau and Finn Spicer for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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